This article provides a brief introduction to psychological emotion theories, particularly appraisal theory. According to appraisal theory emotions are combinations of a person’s appraisal of the novelty, valence, certainty, goal conduciveness, causal agency, controllability, and morality of a situation. These dimensions correspond to elements of the stories attorneys attempt to create in arguing a case. Appraisal theory puts specific content into the vague concept of reappraisal, accounting for emotional changes that go beyond the changes in valence and intensity generally studied (...) by law and emotions scholars. (shrink)

Formalised knowledge systems, including universities and research institutes, are important for contemporary societies. They are, however, also arguably failing humanity when their impact is measured against the level of progress being made in stimulating the societal changes needed to address challenges like climate change. In this research we used a novel futures-oriented and participatory approach that asked what future envisioned knowledge systems might need to look like and how we might get there. Findings suggest that envisioned future systems will need (...) to be much more collaborative, open, diverse, egalitarian, and able to work with values and systemic issues. They will also need to go beyond producing knowledge about our world to generating wisdom about how to act within it. To get to envisioned systems we will need to rapidly scale methodological innovations, connect innovators, and creatively accelerate learning about working with intractable challenges. We will also need to create new funding schemes, a global knowledge commons, and challenge deeply held assumptions. To genuinely be a creative force in supporting longevity of human and non-human life on our planet, the shift in knowledge systems will probably need to be at the scale of the enlightenment and speed of the scientific and technological revolution accompanying the second World War. This will require bold and strategic action from governments, scientists, civic society and sustained transformational intent. (shrink)

Meaning in philosophy, by K. Lehrer.--Meaning in linguistics, by A. Lehrer.--Theories of meaning, by W. Alston.--Of names, by J. S. Mill.--Of words, by J. Locke.--Of language, by G. Berkeley.--Signs and behavior situations, by C. Morris.--Meaning and verification, by M. Schlick.--Meaning and use, by R. Wells.--The meaning of a word, by J. Austin.--Meaning and speech acts, by J. R. Searle.--Meaning and linguistic analysis, by C. C. Fries.--The semantic compound of a linguistic description, by J. J. Katz.--Componential analysis and universal semantics, by (...) J. Lyons.--Bibliographical essay (p. 213-216). (shrink)

Meaning in philosophy, by K. Lehrer.--Meaning in linguistics, by A. Lehrer.--Theories of meaning, by W. Alston.--Of names, by J. S. Mill.--Of words, by J. Locke.--Of language, by G. Berkeley.--Signs and behavior situations, by C. Morris.--Meaning and verification, by M. Schlick.--Meaning and use, by R. Wells.--The meaning of a word, by J. Austin.--Meaning and speech acts, by J. R. Searle.--Meaning and linguistic analysis, by C. C. Fries.--The semantic compound of a linguistic description, by J. J. Katz.--Componential analysis and universal semantics, by (...) J. Lyons.--Bibliographical essay (p. 213-216). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 33.3 (2000) 298-302 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Rhetoric Retold: Regendering the Tradition from Antiquity Through the Renaissance Rhetoric Retold: Regendering the Tradition from Antiquity Through the Renaissance. Cheryl Glenn. Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1997. Pp. xii + 235. $19.95 paperback; $49.95 hardback. The past decade has produced a number of collections on women and rhetoric, women in rhetoric, and feminist approaches (...) to rhetoric. Reviewers of these collections have commended their contributions as pioneering works [End Page 298] in a new field while calling for book-length studies offering sustained appraisals of individual women figures and theoretical bases for approaching individual women and rhetorical issues, which must be approached differently if women and feminist issues are to be incorporated into the study of rhetoric. Ethos and audience, intention and identification, agonistic argumentation and collective narrative modes of argumentation--each of these takes on new shadings and nuances when women's practices are examined, and when various feminist theories are employed to assess those practices.Glenn's study is a welcome newcomer, a sustained analysis of rhetorical issues across periods, an analysis developed by spotlighting a series of women figures. Very deliberately, Glenn includes "heroic" figures such as Aspasia and Elizabeth I alongside their "lesser" sisters: the marginalized, until now unheard, and often uneducated women who developed rhetorics within severe restraints. The exposition illuminates a number of points in current feminist theory that are shaping rhetorical studies. Some may fault the selections in Glenn's study, and the inevitable omissions, and some may object that focusing on women's silence is yet another victim narrative. Careful readers, however, will find that the discussion of silence in women's rhetoric deftly reverses the traditional negative connotations: "Silence is perhaps the most undervalued and under-understood traditionally feminine rhetorical site" (175). Silence need not be read simply as "passivity. Silence may take many forms and serve many functions" (176), including "enlightened presence" (177).In "Cartographies of Silence" (The Dream of the Common Language, New York: Norton, 1978), Adrienne Rich writes, Silence can be a plan rigorously executed the blueprint to a life Do not confuse it with any kind of absence. (17) Rhetoric Retold begins and concludes by "mapping the silences" of women's presence in the history of rhetoric, and in the very conception of rhetoric. Like Rich, Glenn defines the subtle complexities of silence and absence: silence can indeed be a plan, rigorously executed. We should not confuse it with any kind of absence. Until recently, most histories of rhetoric have not given much attention to women as individual figures or as practitioners [End Page 299] of distinct rhetorical genres. Quite to the contrary, many histories have simply asserted, without proof or evidence, that women have always been forbidden to study or practice rhetoric. Strong assertions of absence belie the truth intimated by Democritus's rebuke: "A woman must not practice argument. This is dreadful. To be ruled by a woman is the ultimate outrage for a man" (Ancilla to the PreSocratic Philosophers, trans. Kathleen Freeman, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1983, 103). Glenn's double starting point is the question, who left them out, and why? Their absence from our histories has been one among many sources of their silence. The historiographical discussion happily avoids simple charges of phallocentrism and misogyny and instead looks at how entire systems of culture, within different periods, constructed women's roles and voices. Deep background detail within each historical section provides a welcome context for thinking through complex questions of what is rhetorical among the many women's discourses presented for consideration.Although Glenn's study does not dwell on this point, some of the fault for the omission of women from histories of rhetoric, and evidence of the rigorous deliberateness of that omission, can be found in the robust maleness of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century classical philology, and the neoclassical educational systems it underwrote. The quip in Pope's "Epistle 2: To a Lady" of The Moral Essay, "Nothing so true as once you [Martha... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Feminist Studies 44, no. 3. © 2018 by Feminist Studies, Inc. 699 Jennifer C. Nash The Political Life of Black Motherhood In 1976, Adrienne Rich wrote, “We know more about the air we breathe, the seas we travel, than about the nature and meaning of motherhood.”1 In the four decades since the publication of Rich’s now-canonical Of Woman Born, Andrea O’Reilly has argued for the advent of “maternal (...) theory” as an academic discipline, the maternal memoir has become a highly popular (and profitable) literary genre, and there has been sustained attention to maternal activism with scholarly analyses of such organizations as Mothers Against Drunk Driving and Mothers of the Movement.2 If Mamie Till Bradley boldly “let the world see” her son’s mutilated body in a 1955 public plea to make visible black suffering and antiblack violence, Valerie Castile’s statement after a jury found a police officer not guilty in the death of her son continued in the tradition of 1. Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), 11. 2. See Andrea O’Reilly, ed., Maternal Theory: A Reader (New York: Demeter Press, 2007); Ann Hulbert, “The Real Myth of Motherhood,” Slate, March 8, 2005; Jennifer C. Nash and Samantha Pinto, “Strange Intimacies: Reading Black Mothering Memoirs,” Public Culture (forthcoming); Danielle Poe, Maternal Activism: Mothers Confronting Injustice (Albany: SUNY Press, 2016); and Ruth Feldstein, Motherhood in Black and White: Race and Sex in American Liberalism, 1930–1965 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000). 700 Jennifer C. Nash Books Discussed in This Essay Revolutionary Mothering: Love on the Front Lines. Edited by Alexis Pauline Gumbs, China Martens, and Mai’a Williams. Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2016. Laboring Positions: Black Women, Mothering and the Academy. Edited by Sekile Nzinga-Johnson. Bradford, ON: Demeter Press, 2013. How All Politics Became Reproductive Politics: From Welfare Reform to Foreclosure to Trump. By Laura Briggs. Oakland: University of California Press, 2017. Birthing Justice: Black Women, Pregnancy, and Childbirth. Edited by Julia Oparah and Alicia Bonaparte. New York: Routledge, 2016. making black (male) pain visible through grief-stricken black motherhood. Castile said, My son loved this state. He had one tattoo on his body and it was of the twin cities, the state of Minnesota with “TC” on it. My son loved this city, and this city killed my son and the murderer gets away.... We’re not evolving as a civilization, we’re devolving, we have taken steps forward, people have died for us to have these rights and now we’re devolving, we’re going back to 1969.3 Her emotional plea reveals the political currency of black maternal suffering, one of the few spaces in which black pain is readily culturally visible. Indeed, there has been intensified scholarly and popular interest in representing black motherhood as both a site constituted by grief and expected loss and as a political position made visible (only) because of its proximity to death. It is certainly the case that a cultural inattention to motherhood has been replaced by an intense investment in representing at least some aspects of “the nature and meaning of motherhood” and 3. “Philando Castile’s Mother Reacts to Verdict,” Washington Post video on YouTube, posted on June 16, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJsD4cCpUA. Jennifer C. Nash 701 in representing certain mothers—particularly black mothers—as symbols of trauma and injury, of pain that can be mobilized for “legitimate” political ends and social change. If, as O’Reilly suggests, maternal theory is now a distinct field, it has been fundamentally shaped by the intellectual and political labor of black feminists—Dorothy Roberts, bell hooks, Alice Walker, Patricia Hill Collins, Hortense Spillers, and Audre Lorde—who have captured the myriad ways that black maternity is cast as pathological, excessive, and marked by aberrant performances of gender and heterosexuality that threaten both the nuclear family and the heterosexual state. Drawing on a varied archive from the Moynihan Report to cultural panics about “kids having kids,” from ongoing representations of black women’s “failure” to breastfeed as a public health crisis to the racialized underpinnings of birth control, black feminist theory... (shrink)

Smart farming has largely been driven by productivity and efficiency aims, but there is an increasing awareness of potential socio-ethical challenges. The responsible research and innovation approach aims to address such challenges but has had limited application in smart farming contexts. Using smart dairying research and development in New Zealand as a case study, we examine the extent to which principles of RRI have been applied in NZ smart dairying development and assess the broader lessons for RRI application in smart (...) farming. We draw on insights from: a review of research on dairy technology use in NZ; interviews with smart dairying stakeholders; and the application of an analytical framework based on RRI dimensions. We conclude that smart dairying R&D and innovation activities have focused on technology development and on-farm use without considering socio-ethical implications and have excluded certain actors such as citizens and consumers. This indicates that readiness to enact RRI in this context is not yet optimal, and future RRI efforts require leadership by government or dairy sector organisations to fully embed RRI principles in the guidelines for large R&D project design. More broadly, enacting RRI in smart farming requires initial identification of RRI readiness in a given sector or country and devising a roadmap and coherent project portfolio to support capacity building for enacting RRI. Additionally, methods for operationalising RRI must be adapted to the context of the national or sectoral innovation system in which smart farming is being developed. (shrink)

The government itself, which is the only mode which the people have chosen to execute their will, is equally liable [with the standing army] to be abused and perverted before the people can act through it. Witness the present Mexican war, the work of comparatively a few individuals using the standing government as their tool; for, in the outset, the people would not have consented to this measure. Henry Thoreau, in “Civil Disobedience” It is easy to say — and often (...) is said — that we cannot have tolerable relations with new revolutionary regimes. The problem is that our anticommunist paranoia has made it impossible to find out. We do not know whether Mao's declared interest in a relationship with the Americans in the 1940s or Ho Chi Minh's were sincere. And the reason we don't know is that we never tried to find out. Those who reported it was a possibility were hounded out of the foreign service because of our suspicion and fear of communism. The legacy of that era brings to mind Ivan the Terrible's practice of murdering the bearer of bad news. We are more civilized than that; we have been content simply to ruin people's careers. J. William Fulbright, in The Price of Empire This poisonous thing I'm trying to describe is [a] characteristic way of dealing with criticism. It used to be enough to brand a critic as a radical or a leftist to make people turn away. Now we need only to call him a liberal. Soon “moderate” will be the M word, “conservative” will be the C word and only fascists will be in the mainstream. E. L. Doctorow, Brandeis Commencement, May 21, 1989 We have lived with violence for seven years It was not worth one single life But the patriot's fist is at her throat Her voice is in mortal danger... Adrienne Rich, “Natural Resources,” in Dream of a Common Language. (shrink)

J. F. C. Harrison has written that ‘for each age there is a new view of Mr Owen’, which is proof of the fertility and continuing relevance of his ideas. Not just in Britain and America but today around the world anti-poverty campaigners, birth-controllers, collectivists, communitarians, co-operators, ecologists, educationalists, environmentalists, feminists, humanitarians, internationalists, paternalistic capitalists, secularists, campaigners for social justice, trade unionists, urban planners, utopians, welfare reformers can all find something to admire and inspire in the treasure trove that is (...) the thought and actions of Robert Owen. Owen was a creative genius of global significance, a radical writer and activist of international reputation and reach who has inspired those seeking to change human society for the better. The contributors to this volume include not only many of the recognized experts on the life, work and legacy of Owen, but also work from younger scholars or scholars coming to the field afresh. The volume presents the most recent and original research on Owen. Owen notoriously (and impressively) dabbled in many spheres, and this is reflected in the its breadth of content. The unifying themes are Owen’s profile in his own time, and the relevance of his ideas for the generations that followed. His importance for educational and social philosophy, for political economy and for the political theory of socialism are all discussed, as are his contribution as a philanthropic employer, his political activities and the specificities of his historical context. (shrink)

Early in World War I, Virginia Woolf wrote these words: ‘The future is dark, which is on the whole, the best thing the future can be […]’. It is tempting to assume that darkness simply hides the unknown and the threatening. It is more challenging to think of it as Woolf did: rich with possibility in even the most desperate times.We live in what many would readily describe as dark times. These times have brought (among much else) a once-in-a-century public (...) health crisis, the continued redemption of toxic white supremacy, declining trust in and support for public institutions, and growing evidence of impending climate devastation. ‘Dark Futures’ will consider some of the scenes of this devastation and mine them for insights into our predicaments and our prospects. (shrink)

Standpoint theorists have long been clear that marginalization does not make better understanding a given. They have been less clear, though, that social dominance does not make ignorance a given. Indeed, many standpoint theorists have implicitly committed themselves to what I call the strong epistemic disadvantage thesis. According to this thesis, there are strong, substantive limits on what the socially dominant can know about oppression that they do not personally experience. I argue that this thesis is not just implausible but (...) politically pernicious; it is an excuse for ignorance and silence that stifles our ability to address many injustices. Moreover, I argue that if we are to avoid lending support to the SEDT while working within a standpoint theory framework, we must hold that the socially dominant can achieve marginalized standpoints. So, we must hold that men can achieve feminist standpoints, that white women (and men) can achieve black feminist standpoints, and so on. (shrink)

El presente artículo se propone abordar la obra de Adam Smith con el objeto de identificar una posible “teoría sobre la igualdad” en el corpus del filósofo escocés. Nuestro planteamiento cuestiona el ideario colectivo en torno a este autor, según el cual se lo caracteriza como cercano al anti-igualitarismo de ciertas corrientes liberales. Basándonos en investigaciones hechas en los últimos años por algunos estudiosos de Smith, expondremos argumentos e ideas presentes en su obra que se pueden asociar a posiciones igualitaristas (...) y que muestran que su postura sobre este tema es más compleja de lo que se cree. En esta línea, con el fin de evidenciar la posición de Smith acerca de la igualdad, presentaremos su concepción sobre el surgimiento de la desigualdad y ciertas ideas plasmadas en La Riqueza de las Naciones y en Teoría de los Sentimientos Morales relevantes para la discusión. En esta tarea, tomaremos como principal referente el trabajo de Samuel Fleischacker, cuya interpretación de Smith -que será complementada con análisis propios- tenemos también el objeto de difundir. (shrink)

Filozofické pojednání vysvětluje z hlediska marxistického pojetí dějin základní otázky společenského dění, úlohu materiálních činitelů ve vývoji společnosti, protiklad materiálního a ideálního ve společnosti. Druhé vydání je upraveno s přihlédnutím ke kritickým připomínkám.

Louis Bautain (1796–1867) has been described as the “French Newman” because of the resemblances between their lives and writings. This essay compares three aspects of the thought of Newman and Bautain: their respective understanding of faith, reason, and development. Both thinkers understood faith and reason in relation to conversion and the realities of life and viewed faith and reason as functioning in tandem with doctrinal development.

The government itself, which is the only mode which the people have chosen to execute their will, is equally liable [with the standing army] to be abused and perverted before the people can act through it. Witness the present Mexican war, the work of comparatively a few individuals using the standing government as their tool; for, in the outset, the people would not have consented to this measure. Henry Thoreau, in “Civil Disobedience”It is easy to say — and often is (...) said — that we cannot have tolerable relations with new revolutionary regimes. The problem is that our anticommunist paranoia has made it impossible to find out. We do not know whether Mao's declared interest in a relationship with the Americans in the 1940s or Ho Chi Minh's were sincere. And the reason we don't know is that we never tried to find out. Those who reported it was a possibility were hounded out of the foreign service because of our suspicion and fear of communism. The legacy of that era brings to mind Ivan the Terrible's practice of murdering the bearer of bad news. We are more civilized than that; we have been content simply to ruin people's careers. J. William Fulbright, in The Price of Empire (1989) This poisonous thing I'm trying to describe is [a] characteristic way of dealing with criticism. It used to be enough to brand a critic as a radical or a leftist to make people turn away. Now we need only to call him a liberal. Soon “moderate” will be the M word, “conservative” will be the C word and only fascists will be in the mainstream. E. L. Doctorow, Brandeis Commencement, May 21, 1989We have lived with violence for seven yearsIt was not worth one single lifeBut the patriot's fist is at her throatHer voice is in mortal danger...Adrienne Rich, “Natural Resources,” in Dream of a Common Language (Norton, 1978). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 689 present the spirit of Catholic Christianity to contemporary man in such a way that it [Catholic Christianity, not contemporary man!] appears credible in itself and its historical development..." (emph. mine). Clearly, de Lubac's entire theology is an effort to say the opposite of what the mistranslation regrettably says. Page 46: "his articles, however, which from 1972 [typographical correction: 1942] on prepared for his works on modern (...) atheism (1944/1945)..." On pages 80 and 115, the word "mysterial" is introduced; it should be "mystical." On page 94-95, "the strict rejection of all reduction of God's living consciousness [correction: the living consciousness of God] to logical categories" is misleading because Balthasar is referring to man's living consciousness of God. Page 101: " We experience what a true theology [correction: theologian] is for de Lubac..." On the same page there are two typographical errors, adding a parenthesis and omitting quotation marks. Abbe Monchanin's De l'esthetique a la mystique (From Aesthetics to Mysticism) is mistranslated as From Asceticism to Mysticism on page 102. This 1991 edition translates Henri de Lubac's name for the first and only time as " Henry de Lubac" on page 118. Michael Waldstein's and Susan Clement's translations are fine and readable. The Catholic Universtiy of America Washington, D.C. MARK D. NAPACK Hans Urs von Balthasar. His Life and Work. Edited by DAVID L. SCHINDLER. San Francisco: Communio Books/Ignatius Press, 1991. Pp. 305. This is an important contribution to English-language scholarship on the Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar. As such it marks a nice complement to the volume edited by John Riches, The Analogy of Beauty: The Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1986). Schindler's volume is a slightly edited translation of Hans Urs von Balthasar: Gestalt und Werke, edited by Karl Lehmann and Walter Kasper (Cologne: Communio, 1989). Most of the articles appeared in one or more of the many editions of Communio International Catholic Review, the periodical founded by Balthasar. The richness of the volume lies not only in the quality of individual selections but in the range of material that is covered. Many areas of Balthasar's life and work have remained little known, especially in the English-speaking world, until the appearance of this volume. The pur- 690 BOOK REVIEWS pose of the book, according to Schindler's preface, is "to help display [Balthasar's] vision and the character and range of his service to the Church and to culture" (p. xiii). There are several essays in the volume which shed new light on Balthasar's life, as well as on his philosophical position. Peter Henrici's lengthy biographical sketch is the most complete such contribution available until now, even though he calls it "preliminary and inadequate " (p. 7). It is extremely useful, in conjunction with Balthasar's own autobiographical statements, to situate the written work in the context of a large mission in the Church. It is also helpful in clarifying the relationship between Balthasar and the Jesuit order: his entry into the Society of Jesus, his studies, his departure from the Jesuits, and the attempted reconciliation with them shortly before his death. The extent of his health problems, also, only underlines the value of his literary production. Many details concerning the meeting with Adrienne von Speyr and the founding of the secular institute ]ohannesgemeinschaft are also provided. Throughout these activities and the writings that surround them, "the issue is the Church in the world, not a radiating of the Church's holiness into the profane world, but the leavening of the world from within in order to make visible God's glory which still shines in this world" (p. 24). Henrici has another essay in the collection on the philosophy of Balthasar. This is a little explored area of Balthasar's writings and Henrici's contribution is especially valuable. By clarifying Balthasar's position in relation to key figures in the history of philosophy, it provides many significant hints to facilitate the integration of Balthasar's theology within the academic milieu. Balthasar reflected on the possibilities of an encounter between Catholic theology and modern thought. By the... (shrink)

What is compassion? I suggest that it is, as Adam Smith and David Hume once argued, a moral sentiment that is subject to a great many constraints and variations but is nonetheless “natural.” I also consider Nietzsche's rather vehement attack on Mitleid and current social psychological literature on empathy.

There seems to be no end to moralizing about the vices, but there is too little appreciation of them as mere human foibles and an essential part of the “human circus.” There are also serious questions about whether some of the so-called deadly sins are sinful at all.

Too often, since the 19th century, sensitivity is dismissed as mere “sentimentality” in philosophy and in literature. It is charged that sentimentality is distorting, self-indulgent, self-deceptive. I argue that all of these charges are misplaced or themselves distorted and betray a suspicion of emotions and the tender sentiments that is unwarranted.

Do we love for reasons? Most romantics would insist not. In fact, we love despite good reasons not to love. I argue that love necessarily involves reasons. I discuss the problem of loving someone for his or her looks and what I call Plato's Problem, loving only the properties of a person. I end by discussing some dubious and perverse reasons for love.

Spirituality is often dismissed as mere sentimentality. It is also often opposed to science and the scientific worldview, as if the one is anathema to the other. I suggest that spirituality has distinct advantages over religion and is not at all opposed to science or scientific thinking.

Basic Cartesian intuitions are directed at simple natures, not truths; but intuitions are also a foundation for propositional knowledge. There are two basic objectives of this chapter: to show how Descartes gets from intuitions to propositional knowledge, and to show how his solution to this problem structures his thinking on the main issues in Cartesian epistemology. I maintain that the solution to is to be found in the principle if we perceive the presence of an attribute A, there must be (...) an actually existing substance to which A is attributed. This principle gets its clearest expression in the Principles of Philosophy but also appears in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind and in the Meditations where, I argue, it appears in the form of the Rule of Truth. I show how this principle is derived from the cogito, understood both as inference and as intuition, how this principle plays a role in Descartes theory of consciousness and self‐knowledge, in the case for substance dualism, and in the theory of clear and distinct ideas. (shrink)

The leading idea of this chapter is that, for Descartes, intellectual ideas make it obvious what metaphysical category the properties they disclose to the mind fall into but not whether they are actually exemplified; sensations make it obvious whether the properties they disclose to the mind are exemplified but not what their metaphysical category is. This idea is worked out through a discussion of three stages in the development of Descartes's doctrine of the material falsity of sensory ideas, the core (...) concept of his error explanation of the senses. Material falsity is a set of three defects that sensations have in comparison with intellectual ideas, ideas that fully discharge the role, which Descartes assigns to ideas in his philosophical system. The first stage, reflected in Meditation III, identifies material falsity with two defects: nonrepresentation and misrepresentation ; the second stage, reflected in the Reply to Arnauld, identifies material falsity with obscure ideas ; the third stage, reflected in the Principles of Philosophy I, sees the terminology of material falsity disappear and the terminology of clear but not distinct ideas appear. Other topics discussed include a special application of the rule of truth and skepticism. (shrink)

How can a Cartesian idea represent ordinary physical objects? One possibility is that Descartes holds a theory of natural signs according to which ideas, including sensations, represent states of the external world that are correlated with them. I deny that Descartes has a theory of natural signs in this sense, arguing, instead, that our perception of ordinary physical objects is achieved not through ideas, properly speaking, but through a special act of the mind which projects its sensations onto objects in (...) the external world, objects truly represented by ideas of primary qualities alone. This ”projection” comprises referral judgments that account for the characteristic phenomenology of experience of the physical world but in a way that misleads us to think that our ideas bear a resemblance to the underlying metaphysical reality of the physical world. Other issues discussed include Descartes's taxonomy of ideas. (shrink)